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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
SOUTH EAST FURNITURE 





MISSION OF UTAH, oper-





I '·•'•! • 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This proceeding is brought by the plaintiff, under 
Chapter 55, Section ll(f), Laws of Utah, 1937, for the 
purpose of reviewing a decision and order of the In-
dustrial Commission of Utah, operating as the Utah 
Labor Relations Board, in the matter of certification of 
employes of the South East Furniture Company, for the 
purpose of collective bargaining, which decision and 
order, made and entered by the said Board on the 16th 
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day of August, 1940, certified that United Industrial 
Local Union No. 1068 .was authorized and appointed by 
'a majority of the employes engaged and employed in 
the department theretofore determined by the said 
Board as the appropriate unit for collective bargaining 
purposes with the South East Furniture Comany, the 
plaintiff herein, and ordered and directed the plaintiff, 
without further delay, to enter into negotiations for the 
purpose of collective bargaining with the said local union, 
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
·ment, or other conditions of employment. 
On or a bout July 26, 1940, the said union notified 
the plaintiff that it represented a majority of a certain 
group of employes of the plaintiff, and demanded to bar-
gain collectively with the plaintiff in behalf of said em-
ployes. The plaintiff informed the union officials that 
it did not believe that the union had a majority of the 
said employes, and declined to bargain with said union 
until such· majority was satisfactorily established. On 
July 27, 1940, a strike was called of certain of said 
employes. On July 30, 1940, an informal meeting was 
held with Commissioner William M. Knerr presiding as 
a conciliator, Mr. Knerr having been c~lled in as such 
conciliator by the union officials, and the company rep-
!~sentatives having voluntarily attended said meeting. 
On July 31, 1940, after having allegedly checked 
the payroll of the said company a:gainst a list of names 
subm~tted. by the union, and allegedly interviewing some 
of the alleged union applicants, and upon that basis, 
the said defendant, as the Utah Labor Relations Board, 
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certified the United Industrial Local Union as the ap-
propriate unit for the purpose of collective bargaining 
for the employes of the plaintiff company employed in 
the shipping, servicing, delivery, and general warehouse 
work. 
A subsequent meeting . called by Commissioner 
Knerr, as conciliator, was attended voluntarily by the 
plaintiff and representatives of the union, on August 2, 
1940, in an attempt to conciliate and mediate the con-
troversy between the employer and the union. and, if 
possible, as stated by the defendant Board, for the pur-
pose of having the men return to work. 
On August 1, 1940, the plaintiff filed a formal pro-
test to the said certification of the defendant, and re-
quested an appropriate hearing upon due notice, and 
further requested that the defendant Board arrange for 
a secret ballot of the said employes, for the purpose 
of determining the appropriate unit for collective bar-
gaining purposes, and whether or not said union did, 
in fact, represent a majority of the employes in the ap-
propriate bargaining unit. In the said protest, the plain-
tiff, in substance, alleged that the said union did not 
truly represent a majority of plaintiff's employes nor 
a majority of the employes in the classification men-
tioned; the plaintiff further alleged that the sales and 
office employes should be classified together with the 
employes mentioned, in one unit, for collective bargain-
ing; the plaintiff further alleged that the certification 
of the defendant Board was based upon inadequate and 
incomplete investigation, which failed to establish that 
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the said-' union :represented a majority of the ·said em-
ployes of plaintiff at the time the said protest was filed; 
plaintiff further objected that the said certification was 
not made .after an appropriate hearing upon due notice, 
and that no secret ballot was taken as a basis ,for said 
certification, and that such investigation and certifica-
tion was made while part of said employes were out on 
strike, and under conditions which made it difficult, if 
not impossible, to determine whether or not all the said 
employes were still in the employ of the plaintiff com-
pany. 
On August 2, 1940, Commissioner Knerr trans-
mitted to the plaintiff a communication from the union 
officials, in ·which the said union consented to the con-
ducting of a secret ballot among the employes of the 
unit theretofore designated by the Board as the appro-
priate unit for collective bargaining. On August 3, 1940, 
the plaintiff replied in substance to Commissioner Knerr, 
consenting to a secret ballot, on condition that no charges 
of alleged unfair labor practices, up to the time of said 
ballot, be filed or considered, and that all the said com-
pany's employes, save for managers, assistant managers, 
and supervisors, be classified together and allowed to 
cast their ballot. 
On August 7, 1940, the Industrial Commission 
adopted a resolution calling a hearing for August 9, 
1940, at the hour of 10 :00 o'clock A.M., for the purpose 
of determining the question of representation for col-
lective bargaining in the said matter. A copy of the said 
resolution was served upon the plaintiff on August 7, 
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1940. At the outs.et of the said hearing, the· plaintiff 
objected to the sufficiency of notiee of the said hearing, 
and called the attention of the defendant Board to the 
fact that the notice of one day did not constitute due 
notice within the meaning of the statute. The Board, 
' . 
nevertheless, proceeded with the said hearing, as sched-
uled, and on the 16th day of August, 1940, rendered its 
decision and made its order, in substance and effect that 
the said union, as of July 26, 1940, had a majority of the 
employes in the department theretofore designated by 
the Board as the appropriate unit for collective bar-
gaining purposes, and denying a secret ballot among the 
said employes, and ordering and directing the plaintiff, 
without further delay, to enter into negotions for the 
purpose of collective bargaining with the said local 
union, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, or other conditions of employment. The said 
decision and order was made and entered upon the 
affirmative vote of Commissioner Knerr and McShane, 
Commissioner Jugler voting in the negative. Commis-
sioner J ugler further filed a dissenting opinion, in 
substance and effect holding that all the employes named 
on the list furnished by the plaintiff company should 
be classified together as one unit for collective bargain-
ing purposes, and that a secret ballot should be con-
ducted of the said employes, for the purpose of deter-
mining whether or not the said union had a majority. 
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
As stated in plaintiff's petition for review, plaintiff 
contends that the said decision and order of the defen-
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dant Board is without legal right and ·contrary to law, 
and the ·plaintiff is aggrieved thereby for the following 
reasons, to-wit : 
1. That the notice of one day, given the plaintiff 
of the said hearing of August 9, 1940, did not constitute 
due or legal notice, and was not sufficient or reasonable 
notice ''to enable the plaintiff and others interested in the 
said hearing adequately and properly to prepare and 
present to the Board evidence pertaining to the issues 
to be presented at the said hearing. 
2. That at the said hearing of August 9, 1940, the 
said Board entirely failed and refused to take any evi-
dence or seek any information to enable it adequately 
to determine the proper representative of the employes 
of the plaintiff company for collective bargaining pur-
poses. 
3. That the said decision of said Board, designat-
ing ·and classifying certain employes as the proper unit 
for collective bargaining purposes, was made without 
adequate inquiry or consideration, was directly contrary 
to the expressed written wishes of 67 per cent of the 
employes of the plaintiff company, and was made solely 
for the reason and upon the ground that the said union 
requested such classification. 
4. That the said decision of the said Board, de-
nying a secret ballot of the employes of the said com-
pany, was contrary to law, and was made in the face 
of the express consent of the said union that such an 
election be had, on condition that it be confined to the 
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employes of the unit, as classified by the Board in its 
decision of August 16, 1940, as aforesaid, and was made 
in disregard of all the facts and circumstances and 
evidence presented· to· ·the Board to the effect that a 
fair _and just determination as to the said representa-
tion could not be h~~d. in any other way than by a secret 
ballot. 
5. That the said decision of the defendant Board 
was made solely on the basis of alleged applications for 
membership in the said union, previously presented to 
the said Board by the said union, and without any check 
or evidence as to whether the persons who allegedly 
signed the said applications in fact desired the said union 
to represent them at the time of the said decision of 
the Board on August 16, 1940. 
6. That the said decision of the said Board was 
made while some of the said employes affected by the 
said decision were out on strike from the said company, 
and while informal charges of alleged unfair labor prac-
tices filed by the said union against this plaintiff were 
pending and undetermined, and upon which charges 
this plaintiff had not and has not yet been afforded 
any hearing whatever. 
ARGUMENT 
We shall discuss the questions for review in the same 
order presented in our petition for review. 
I. THE NOTICE OF ONE DAY OF THE· 
SAID HEARING OF THE BOARD OF AUG-
UST 9, 1940, DID NOT CONSTITUTE DUE 
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·OR LEGAL NOTICE, AND WAS NOT SUFFI-
CIENT OR REASONABLE NOTICE OF THE 
SAID HEARING. 
Chapter 55, Section 10, Sub-section c, Laws of Utah, 
1937, reads as follows: 
''Questions affecting intrastate commerce: 
Whenever a question affecting intrastate com-
merce or the orderly operation of industry arises 
concerning the representation of employees, the 
board may investigate such controversy and cer-
tify to the parties, in writing, the name or names 
of the representatives that have been designated 
or· selected. In any such investigation, the board 
shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon 
due notice, either in conjunction with a proceed-
ing under section 11 or otherwise, and may take 
a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other 
suitable method to ascertain such representa-
tives." · 
It will be noted ~hat this section requires that the 
Board shall "provide for an appropriate hearing upon 
due notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding under 
section 11 or otherwise.'' We grant that the hearing 
in question was not called in conjunction with a pro-
ceeding under section 11, which section has to do with 
hearings upon charges of unfair labor practices, but 
we respectfully call attention to the fact that, under 
the said section 11, the Legislature provided that not 
less than five days' notice must be given of any hearing 
under the said section. There is no express number of 
days of notice provided in the statute for any hearing 
other than hearings under such section 11 ; the only 
require~ent is that the said hearing be ''upon due no-
tice." We call attention, however, to the fact that the 
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matter of determining the appropriate. unit and the rep-
resentatiYe thereof for colle-ctive bargaining purposes, 
is at least as vital and important as the matter of adju-
dicating an alleged unfair labor practice, and that, in 
all fairness, at least as much notice should be given of 
such hearing as of one· called for the purpose of adju:.. 
dicating the charge of unfair labor practice. The hear-
ing of August 9, 1940, was the first formal hearing 
called by the defendant Board for that purpose, and it 
appears that the action of the Board in providing only 
one day's notice for said hearing, was made in utter 
disregard of the vital importance of the question to be 
determined, and of the necessity for a complete and 
thorough investigation of the facts of the matter. 
We have been able to find but one case bearing 
directly upon the question of the sufficiency of notice of 
hearing under the National Act. That is the case of Lane 
Cotton Mills, 1938, 9 N.L.R.B. 952. In that case, the com-
pany was served with an amended complaint and notice 
of hearing on October 16, 1937, after business hours, 
and hearing was held on October 18, 1937. The trial ex-
aminer denied the company's motion for postponement, 
and the Board over-ruled the examiner, stating as fol-
lows: 
''Although the respondent participated in the 
hearing, because of lack of notice, full opportun-
ity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine 
witnesses, and to produce evidence bearing upon 
the issues of the amended complaint, was not at 
the time afforded to it.'' 
It should be noted further that, under the National 
Act, at least five days' notice is provided for the hearing 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of charges of alleged unfair labor practices, and that the 
N.L.R.B. formerly issued regulations requiring five 
days' notice but that the existing rules and regulations 
of N.L.R.B., Section 202.5, series 2, provides that the 
date fixed for the hearing shall not be less than ten days 
after the service of the complaint. 
The action of the defendan~ Board, therefore, in 
affording only one day's notice in the instant case would 
seem to be entirely unwarranted. 
II. AT THE SAID HEARING, THE 
BOARD FAILED TO TAKE ANY EVIDENCE 
OR TO SEEK ANY INFORMATION TO EN-
ABLE IT ADEQUATELY TO DETERMINE 
THE PROPER REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 
EMPLOYES FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING PURPOSES. 
A search of the transcript of the testimony taken 
at the said hearing reveals only testimony and evidence 
pertaining to the classification of the employes as a 
unit for collective bargaining purposes, with the ex-
ception of the petition signed by thirty out of a tota~ 
of forty-five employes in the company, requesting the 
right to vote on any unionization of.the employes, which 
petition is referred to on page 4 of the transcript, and 
which is also made a part of the record, and, with the 
fu;rther exception of Mr. Andrews' testimony on page 5 
and on pages 78, 79, and 80, and Mr. Sorensen's tes-
timony on page 41, as follows: 
'' Q. You have also expressed a desire, 
through your representative here to the Commis-
sion, that you feel that a secret ballot would be 
the only way of determing the desire of your em-
10 
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ployees as to the bargaining agency. Will you 
explain that 1 
''A. I sincerely feel that a secret ballot is 
necessary. I have been informed and believe that 
considerable pressure has been brought on our 
employees by some of the union representatives, 
and the employees of our store can expres.s their 
free opinions only by a secret ballot, so that we 
won't feel they are being influenced. 
'' Q. You believe under the condition that 
has been reported to you that is the only proper 
way to determine this issue 1 
''A. Yes, I think that is the only proper 
way.'' 
It will be noted that the Board did not, at any time 
at the hearing or in conjunction therewith, make any 
inquiry or investigation whatsoever with respect to the 
question of whether or not the said union represented 
a majority of the employes, either in the unit desig-
nated by the Board as the proper bargaining unit, or 
in the company as a whole, either at the time of- its 
decision or at any prior time. In other words, the Board 
went through the formalities of a hearing, because the 
law required such a hearing, but did not seek nor re-
ceive any evidence whatsoever on the vital question 
of whether or not the said union represented a majority 
of the employes; the Board evidently chose to disregard 
entirely the statement of Mr. Sorensen as set forth on 
page 41 of the transcript and the statements of Mr. 
Andrews, as aforesaid, and rested its decision as to the 
existence of a majority of the employes in the union upon 
the prior action of the Board, which certified the union as 
the collective bargaining agent, as of July 26, 1940, solely 
11 
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on the basis of a comparison of union applications with 
a list of employes of the company. In this respect, 
it appears that the Board, at the said hearing, entirely 
closed its eyes and its mind to the vital question of the 
existence of a union majority, and merely rested upon 
its prior certification, which was made without hearing, 
without notice, and without adequate investigation. 
III. THE DECISION OF THE BOARD 
DESIGNATING CERTAIN EMPLOYES AS 
THE PROPER UNIT FOR COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING PURPOSES , WAS MADE 
WITHOUT ADEQUATE INQUIRY OR CON-
SIDERATION, AND WAS DIRECTLY CON-
TRARY TO THE EXPRESS WRITTEN 
WISHES OF 67 PER CENT OF THE EM-
PLOYES. 
At the said hearing, the Board was faced with two 
requests : first, a request from the local union that the 
employ~s in the shipping, servicing, delivery, and gen-
eral warehouse work of the company be designated as 
the proper unit for collective bargaining purposes; and, 
second, a request voluntarily submitted and filed by 
the employes themselves, acting through one of their 
number, Mr. Thos. K. Andrews, signed by thirty out of 
forty-five employes in the entire company, asking that 
all t-he said employes have a right to vote on any unioni-
zation of the employes of the company. The Board saw 
fit after the said hearing, to deny and disregard the 
request of the said thirty employes, and to grant the 
request of the union, and. classified the employes in ac-
cordance with the union's request and contrary to the 
wishe·s of the said thirty employes, many of whom were 
among those who had allegedly signed union applica-
12 
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tions: It· would appear that such action ·of the· Board, 
in choosing to follo'v implicitly the ·demands of·the union 
in preference to the express written ·request of the em-
ployes themselves, does violence to the ·very spirit and 
essence of the Utah Labor Relations Act, in that it exalts 
the union above the employes, and curbs the ''full free-
dom of association, self-organization, and designation 
of representatives of their (the employes) own choos-
ing,'' as set forth in the said law, and subordinates the 
will of the employes to that of the union. 
While it is admitted that the plaintiff, through Mr. 
H. A. Sorensen, expressed its belief that it would be to 
the best interest of the employes, and in the interest. 
of harmony in the company that all the employes be 
classified in one unit, and that dissention would ensue 
if such classification were not made (Tr. 37), the em-
ployer made such observation in sincerity and with the 
firm conviction that the action recommended by the 
employer would bring about harmony and good will in 
his establishment. The request for classification of all 
the employes in one unit sprang volu!ltarily from the 
employes themselves; and their representative, Mr. An~ 
drews, was interrogated severely a.nd at length by Com-
missioner Knerr, for the purpose of eliciting some evi-
dence of influence or coercion on the part of the em-
ployer, in the instigation of the said request, but the 
said interrogation of the said Mr. Andrews brought out 
emphatically the fact that the said request was wholly 
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Whil~ admitting the soundness generally of the pol .. 
iey of protecting employes against coerc.i ve influences 
on the part of the employer, and the consequent possible 
need for the protective measures afforded by law in be .. 
half of unions, as against employers, we fail to see where, 
by all rules of reason alid justice, there is any justifica .. 
tion for a labor board to close its eyes completely to the 
expressed wishes of 67 per cent of the e·mployes of a 
c.ompany, a.nd_ to follow blindly the demands of a union, 
in conflict with the said employes' request, particularly 
where the· employer is not involved in the said contro-
versy beyond expressing its wish and desire that the 
request of the employes be followed, in the inte-rest of 
harmony and peace. 
In connection with the classification ordered by the 
Board we respectfully call attention to the fact that the 
union representative, in the first instance, claimed that 
"nowhere throughout the United States has the Congress 
for Industrial Organization ever admitted to its mem-
bership or claimed jurisdiction over the employes herein 
exempted. '' (From letter of August 5, 1940, to Utah La-
bor Relations Board, signed Frank Bonacci). At the 
hearing, Mr. Bonacci stated, in substance, that he did not 
claim jurisdiction over the employes _exempted as afore-
said (Tr. 9), but stated that in several small stores and 
restaurants, cashiers are sometime taken into the union 
(Tr. 13). Mr. Bonacci further stated, in substance, that 
he did not take in the employes excepted, because he did 
not want them in the union (Tr. 17), and stated further 
that there is nothing to prevent the C.I.O. from organ-
izing said employes ( Tr. 21). 
14 
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Mr. Varro C. Jones, organizer for C.I.O., ·called to 
testify by Commissioner Knerr, testified in substance 
that, if the thirty men in question, employes of the South 
East Furniture Company, had made application for one 
charter for their group, such charter would have been· 
granted by the C.I.O. (Tr. 65-66), and that the men 
themselves determine the classification the group shall 
be in (Tr. 64). 
Furthermore, the documents submitted by the plain-
tiff company at the said hearing (marked Exhibits A, 
B, C, D, E, F, G, and H), we believe, constitute evidence 
that the C.I.O. does frequently include in one unit em-
ployes in shipping, servicing, delivery, warehouse, 
clerical, and sales departments of a company. Despite 
the evidence submitted to that effect, the Board. erron-
eously, we think, chose to follow the demands of the 
union and to classify the bargaining unit in accordance 
with such demands. 
The Board's power to define the approprite unit 
for purposes of collective bargaining is set forth in Sub-
se·ction b of Section 10, Chapter 55, Laws of Utah, 1937, 
as follows: 
''Appropriate unit. 
The board shall decide in each case whether, 
in order to insure to employees the full benefit of 
their right to self-organization and to collective 
bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the poli-
cies of this act, the unit appropriate for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining shall be the em-
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The above quoted sub-section was copied word for 
word from Sub--section b of Section 9 of the National 
Labor Relations Act. Therefore, it would seem that the 
decisions of the National Labor Relations Board per-
taining to this subsection, should be a safe guide for this 
court to follow. 
We quote from the Third Annual Report, N.L.R.B., 
1938 and Fourth Annual Report N.L.R.B., 1939, page 
83, as follows : 
"Self-organization among employees is gener-
ally grounded in a community of interest in their 
occupations, and more particularly in their quali-
fications, experience, duties, wages, hours, and 
other working conditions. This community of in-
terest may lead to organization along craft lines, 
along industrial lines, or in any of a number of 
other forms representing adaptations to special 
circumstances. The complexity of modern indus-
try, transportation, and communication, and the 
numerous and diverse forms which self-organiza-
tion among employees can take and has taken, 
preclude the application of rigid rules to the de-
termination of the unit appropriate for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining. 
''In attempting to ascertain the groups 
among which there is that mutual interest in the 
objects of collective bargaining which must exist 
in an appropriate unit, the Board takes into con-
sideration the facts and circumstances existing 
in each case. The nature of the work done by the 
employees involved, their training and the extent 
of their responsibilities, and the organization of 
the employer's business are all entitled to weight. 
In evaluating these factors, the Board must also 
consider the history of collective bargaining, 
whether successful or otherwise, among the em-
ployees involved as well as among other employees 
in the same industry or in similar industries. 
16 
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Finally the- Board ·m.ust evaluate various other 
factors 'Yhich tend to show the presence or ab-
sence of a mutual interest in collective bargain-
ing bet~een var~ous gro~ps .of employees. 
''The precise weight to be given to any of 
the releYant factors. cannot be mathematically 
stated. Generally several considerations enter 
into each decision.'' (Third Annual Report, 
NLRB, 1938 (page 157). 
''The Board must determine frequently 
whether the unit or units shall be industrial, in-
chiding practically all the employees in the plant, 
semi-industrial; including a. majority of the em-
ployees, multicra.ft, including several groups of 
skilled· ·workers, craft, including one group of 
skilled workers, or some otper unit, including only 
part of the employees.'' (Fourth Annual Report, 
NLRB, 1939 (page 83). 
As to centralization of management, an employe 
unit was held appropriate because of a central employ-
ment office, interchange of employes; . one superinten-
. . 
dent, and a central handling of grievance problems. 
Aluminum Co. of America, (1938) 6 NLRB 444. 
Similarly, the matter of central management resulted in 
a designation of one unit in the following cases: 
United Shipya'rds, Inc., (1938) 5 NLRB 742 
Standard Oil Company of Calif., (1938) 5 NLRB 
750 . 
Waggoner Refining Co., Inc., (1938) 6 NLRB 731 
Stackpole Carbon Co., (1938) 6 NLRB 171 
Paraga Rubber Co., (1938) 6 NLRB 23 
The .Amerir;a~n Brass Co., (1938) 6 NLRB 723 
American Hardware Corp., (1937) 4 NLRB 412 
17 
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Kling Factories, (1938) 8 NLRB 1228 
The Borg Paper Co., (1938) 8 NLRB 657 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., (1938) 8 
NLRB 508 
As to community of interest, we quote from the 
.Third Annual Report of N.L.R.B., 1938, page 174, as 
follows: 
''Under the .terms of the Act, the Board, in 
determining the appropriate unit, attempts to 
insure to employees the full benefit of the right to 
self-organization and to collective bargaining. The 
chief object of the Board, therefore, is to join in 
a single unit only such employees and all such em-
ployees, as have a mutual interest in the objects 
of collective bargaining. The appropriate unit 
selected must operate for the mutual benefit of 
all the employees included therein. To express 
it another way, the Board must consider whether 
there is that community of interest among the 
employees which is likely to further harmonious 
organizations and facilitate collective bargain-
ing.'' 
Some of the N.L.R.B. decisions grouping together 
those employes having common economic interests are 
the foil owing : 
International Mercantile Mar~ne Co., (1936) 1 
NLRB 384 
Tennessee Copper Compam,y (1938) 5 NLRB 768 
Th.e Texas Co., (1939) 11 NLRB 925 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., (1939) 15 NLRB 515 
(Where employees of several plants were 
grouped together as one unit because the in-
terests of such employes were interwoven, 
and the collective bargaining for all the plants 
18 
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involved, in the opinion of the Board, could 
most effectively be achieved through the e~s­
tablishment of a single bargaining unit.) 
Fisher Body Corp., (1938) 7 NLRB 1083 
The Calco Chemical Co., Inc., {1939) 13 NLRB 34 
Nekoosa-Edw·ards Paper Co., {1939) 11 NLRB 
446 
Terminal Flour Mills Co., (1938) 8 NLRB 381 
The Osgood Co., (1937) 4 NLRB 312 
As to the desire of the employes, we quote in part 
from the Third Annual Report of N.L.R.B., 1938, be-
ginning on page 167, as follows: 
"The Board has given great weight to the 
desires of employees as expressed by their forms 
of self-organization; and it has also considered 
whether certain groups of employees have ex-
pressed a will to be included or excluded from a 
particular unit, in determining the bounds of that 
•t " urn. 
Accordingly, in the case of The Globe Machine am,d 
Stamping Co., {1937) 3 NLRB 294, where three unions 
advocated a division of the employes into three units, 
and a fourth union contended for a single unit for all 
employes, the Board stated in part as follows : 
''In such a case wher9' the considerations are 
so evenly balanced, the determining factor is the 
desire of the men themselves. On this point, the 
record affords no help ... The only documentary 
proof is completely contradictory. We will there-
fore order elections to be held separately for the 
men engaged in polishing and those engaged in 
punch press work. We will also order an election 
for the mployees of the company engaged in pro-
duction and maintenance, exclusive of the pol-
19 
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ishers and punch press workers and of clerical 
and supervisory employees . . . '' 
To similar effect is the Commonwealth Division of 
Ge'fberal Steel Castings Corporation, (1937) 3 NLRB 779. 
As tq past experience of workers in the plant 'with 
respect to collective bargaining units, it is evident that 
in ·the instant case, there is no previous experience upon 
which to base a determination. 
With reference to the matter of functional coherence 
and interdependence of the ·various . departments and 
employes, we quote from the Third -Annual Report of 
_N.L.R.B., 1938, p~ges 191-192, as follows: 
''Hence the Board has held that a close inter-
relation of the work of various departments of a 
plant tends to support a finding of one plant unit, 
rather than departmental units, and also militates 
against the splitting off of one department from 
a plant unit. Similarly, the fact that two plants 
owned by a company cooperate in the manufac-
ture of some of the company's products supports 
a finding of one unit for the employe·es at both 
plants.'' 
As to interchange of employes, it has been gener-
ally held by the Board that employes whose duties are so 
_nearly alike that they can be transferred throughout 
the departments of one plant, or from plant to plant, 
have a common viewpoint as to working conditions and 
should, therefore, be classified as one unit.· To this ef-
fect, see the following cases : 
Paper, Calmenson & Co., (1938) 10 NLRB 228 
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Lenox Shoe Co., (1937) 4 NLRB 372 
Bingham & Taylor Corp., (1937) 4 NLRB 341 
Federated Fishing Boats of New England (1939) 
15 NLRB 1080. 
With reference to the interdependence of o~erations 
of the employes, it has been generally held that where 
the departmental operations of a plant are so highly 
interdependent that the stoppage of work in any de-
partment necessitates a stoppage of the work in the re-
maining departments, the contention is usually supported 
that a plant unit is the most appropriate. To this effect, 
see the following cases : 
Hamilton Realty Corp., (1938) 10 NLRB 858 
Postal Telegraph-Cable Corp., (1938) 9 NLRB 
1060 
Daily Mirror, Inc., (1938) 5 NLRB 362 
(In which the Board stated in part as follows: 
''The functional interdependence of the var-
ious departments of the company and the 
greater effectiveness of the larger unit for 
collective bargaining make the employer unit 
appropriate.'') 
National Distillers Products Co., (1938) 5 NLRB 
862. 
With reference to the lack of representation of par-
ticular employes excluded, it has generally been held 
by the Board that where the petitioning union desires 
the exclusion of a group of employes from a bargaining 
unit, and the Board finds that there is no bona fide 
union in the plant to which these employes are eligible, 
the Board usually includes them in the unit, so as not 
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to deprive them of the right to bargain collectively. To 
this effect, see the following cases : 
Cupples Co., (1938} 10 NLRB 168 
(Where the union organized the match de-
partment only, and the employer contended 
that an industrial unit embracing all em-
ployes was proper, the employer's contention 
was· upheld by the Board, on the grounds 
that the employes who were not organized 
should not be denied the benefits of the act.) 
Harter Corp., (1938) 8 NLRB 391 
(Where the Board included maintenance 
men and engineers in a plant unit contrary 
to the wishes of the union.) 
Times Publishing Co., (1938) 8 NLRB 1170 
(Where the Board, contrary to the wishes of 
the union, included six composing room em-
ployes who were denied membership· in the 
union because of their brief apprenticeship.) 
Selby Shoe Co., (1939) 15 NLRB 489 
(Where four pressfeeder girls excluded from 
the craft union were placed in the major unit 
by the Board, contrary to the wishes of the 
union.) 
As to the effect of alleged eligibility to membership 
in the union, we quotH from the Third Annual Report 
of N. L. R. B., 1938, pages 166-167, as follows . 
'' * * it is clear that the Board cannot 
be bound in determining the appropriate unit by 
the rules established by the labor organizations in 
the field. Those rules constitute only one of the 
factors which the Board considers in making its 
decision.'' 
IV. IN DENYING A SECRET BALLOT 
IN THE FACE OF THE EXPRESSED CON-
22 
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SENT OF THE UNION THAT SU·CH BALLOT 
BE CONDUCTED, AND IN DISREGARD OF 
ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES, 
THE BOARD ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW, 
AND ITS SAID ACT CONSTITUTED A 
BREACH OF DISCRETION. 
We call attention to the offer of the union (con~ 
tained in the letter from A. M. Peterson to Chairma~ 
W. M. Knerr, dated August 2, 1940) to consent to a 
secret ballot among the employes in the unit d~signated 
by the Board. In respect to that offer, the employ~·~ 
agreed to stipulate in accordance therewith, on condition 
that the . clerical and sales employe·s be included in the 
said unit and be allowed to ballot. The hearing in ques .. 
tion was thereafter called, and, in the course of the 
hearing, Commissioner Knerr, who. presided at the said 
hearing, stated in part as follows : 
''If we hold an election and the Commission 
defines the unit, we may define all the employees 
or take Mr. Bonacci's version of it, we don't 
know. If we define the unit then the employer 
will be authorized to have a representative at the 
ballot box and the employees will designate a 
representative, and those representatives ought 
to be familiar with the activities of every em-
ployee so they can intelligently challenge any 
ballot that may be cast. So if we have an elec-
tion we ought· to be in a position to do that.'' 
(Tr. 35) 
At the same hearing, Commissioner Knerr further 
stated as follows : 
"As a matter of fact, the union has con-
sented to a secret ballot, with the understanding 
that the appropriate unit be determined. So the 
only issue is as to whether or not the proper 
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unit has been determined~ As I understand it, 
the union ·has said they would submit to a secret 
ballot provided the Commission would define 
the proper employees to belong to the union, but 
they challenge, or they ask the Commission not 
to include all the employees that the employer 
wants.'' (Tr. 41) 
Without further comment from the Board or any 
of its members, the next notice that the plaintiff received 
was the decision of the said Board of August 16, 1940, 
wherein a secret ballot was denied and the employer was 
ordered to bargain with the union. 
· At the said hearing, there were two general ques-
tions before the Board for determination, namely: 
First, what is the appropriate unit for col-
lective bargaining purposes~ and 
Second, does the union hold a majority of 
the employes in the said unit~ 
After determining that the appropriate unit was 1n 
accordance with the prior designation of the Board, in 
the light of the consent of the union theretofore given 
and the statement of the Chairman of the Board, indi-
cating that an election would be held after the determin-
ation of the appropriate unit, it would appear that the 
subsequent action of the Board in denying a secret ballot 
was entirely unwarranted and unjustified. 
·. Sub~section c, Se·ction 10, Chapter 55, Laws of Utah, 
1937, governs the method of ascertaining who the repre-
sentative of employes is in such cases. This section 
was copied, word for word, from Section 9 (c) of the 
National Labor Relations Act, save for the fact that the 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
said section of our state law was. made to apply to 
intrastate commerce. This honorable Court has not 
passed upon the question at bar, and the, decisions of 
the federal courts on the National Act are indeed 
meagre. We must, therefore, turn principally to the-
decisions of the N. L. R. B. for light as to the inter-
pretation of this section. First, however, let us turn 
to the expressions of the intention of our national Legis-
lature in enacting National Labor Relations Act. 
The United States House of Representatives Labor 
Committee made a report dated June 10, 1935 (Report 
1147), which reads in part as follows: 
''Section 9 (c) makes provision for elections 
to be conducted by the Board or its agents or 
agencies to ascertain the· representatives of em-
ployees. The question will ordinarily arise as 
between two or more bona fide organizations 
competing to represent the employees, but the 
authority granted here is broad enough to take 
in the not infrequent case where only one such 
organized group is pressing for recognition, and 
its claim of representation is challenged. It is, 
of course, contemplated that pursuant to its 
authority under section 6(a), the Board will 
make and publish appropriate rules governing 
the conduct of elections and determining who may 
participate therein. 
''The committee adheres, with the p.resent 
National Labor Relations Board, to the common 
belief that the device of an election in a demo-
cratic society has, among other virtues, that of 
allaying strife, not provoking it. Obviously the 
Board should not be required to wait until there 
is a strike or immediate threat of strike. Where 
there are contending factions of doubtful or wn-
known strength, or the representation claims of 
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the only organized group in the bargG!ining unit 
are challenged, there exists that poten.tiality of 
strife which the bill is designed to eliminate by 
the establishment of this machinery for prompt, 
governmentally supervised elections.'' (Italics 
ours) 
ThH N. L. R. B., on July 12, 1939, adopted a policy 
which was even more liberal than the policy theretofore 
prevailing with resl?ect to elections. On that day, in the 
case of Cudahy Packing Company, 13, NLRB 526, ana-
tional union introduced in evidence 147 membership 
cards, ·signed during the previous year by employes 
within the appropriate unit of 157 persons, and also 
presented petitions signed within two months preceding 
the hearing by 141 of the said persons, but an indepen-
dent union introduced petitions signed by 43 of the-
said employes, designating the independent union as 
their representative. We quote the text of the decision 
of N. L. R. B. in full as follows: 
"The United claims that it should be certi-
fied upon the proof offered. The Company and 
the Independent, however, assert that an election 
must be held in order to ascertain the true wishes 
of the employees. We are thus faced with con-
flicting claims as to which of the two labor organ-
iaztions, each designated by a substantial number 
of the employees involved, is entitled, under the 
act, to represent all of them. Our determination 
of representatives looks to the initiation of col-
lective bargaining between the Company and its 
employees. We believe that since each of two 
contesting· labor organizations has proved sub-
stantial adherence among the employees, the bar-
gaining relations which result will be more satis-
factory from the beginning if the doubt and dis-
agreement of the parties regarding the wishes 
of the employees is, as far as possible, eliminated. 
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Although hi the past we have certified .represen.-
tatives zoithout an election upon a showing of the 
sort here made, u;e are persuaded by our exper-
ience that the policies of the act will best be 
effectuated if the question of representation which 
has arisen is resolt·ed in an election by secret bal-
lot. We shall, accordingly, direct that such an 
election be held. · 
''It should be noted that we are not here con-
fronted with the necessity of deciding, upon the 
testimony and documentary evidence in the rec-
ord, whether on the date of a;n alleged refusal to 
bargain, the Union represented a majority of the 
employees in the appropriate unit. That question 
could not be answered by an election, for the 
result of a present election would not show the 
Union's authority on the particular past date in 
question. Were it necessary to decide in the pres-
ent case whether the testimony and documentary 
evidence in the record did or did' not establish a 
majority for the Union, we would find that it 
did. However, it is not necessary in this pro-
ceeding to make such a determination on the 
present record. We are here co1~cerned with 
establishing representatives for future barg·arim.-
ing purposes, a;n.d under the circumstances we 
think that such future bargaining will best be 
effectuated by holding a;n. election by secret 
ballot." (Italics ours) 
The best and customary method for resolving ques-
tions of representation under Section 9( c) of National 
~abor Relations Act, has always been by means of elec-
tions conducted under the supervision of the Board. 
In this manner, all doubt as to the desires of the em-
ployes concerning representation is dispelled. The fol-
lowing cases represent only a few of the vast number 
of cases in which the Board has determined the ·bar-
gaining representatives on the basis of an election: 
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In the case of Armour & Company, 13 NLRB 1143, 
decided July 12, 1939, the union produced evidence in 
support of its claim of representation of a majority of 
the employes. The company disputed the claim of the 
union, but offered no evidence. The text of the Board's 
decision follows : 
''At the hearing, the Union offered evidence 
in support of its claim that the majority of the 
employees had designated it as their collective 
bargaining agent. It requests certification upon 
the proof offered. The Company, however, con-
tests the Union's claims. It contends that an 
election is necessary to determine the wishes of 
the employees. Although in the past we have 
certified representatives without an election upon 
a showing of the sort made by this record, we are 
persuaded by our experience that, under the cir-
cumstances of this case, any negotiations entered 
into pursua;nt to a determination of representar 
tives by the Board will be more satisfactory if 
all disagreemen.t between the parties regarding 
the wishes of the employees has been, as far as 
p·ossible, eliminated. We shall therefore direct that 
Ofl1t election by secret ballot be held.'' 4 LRR 
Man. 326. (Italics ours) 
In the case -of Woodward Iron Compa;n.y, 13 NLRB 
71, an election was directed although one union intro-
duced in evidence authorization cards allegedly signed 
by 402 employes within an appropriate unit of 584, 
where a rival union challenged the validity of author-
ization card signatures and contended that the signa-
tures, if genuine, were obtained by coercion. 
In the case of Joe Lowe Corporation, 13 NLRB 76, 
decided July 18, 1939, an election was directed, although 
one union introduced documentary proof of present 
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designation by a majority, where a rival union refusing 
to reveal the names of its members reque~ted an election 
A similar holding is found in the case of National Carbon 
Company, Inc., 13 NLRB 100. 
In the case of National Can Co., 13 NLRB 124, a 
craft union presented proof of 54 signatures out of a 
total of 95, signed and witnessed in the presence of the 
union organizer, but the industrial union objected to 
the use of the petition as the basis for certifying the 
representative, and the Board ordered an election. 
To the same effect is the case of S. Karpen & Bros., 
14 NLRB 36. 
In the case of New York Handkerchief Compa;ny, 
5 NLRB 703, decided as early as February 28, 1938, the 
union claimed to represent a majority of the employes, 
but the company denied the union's majority and refused 
to negotiate. The Board ordered an election. 
In re Gate City Cotton Mills, NLRB 57, decided 
December 7, 1935, the union's claim to represent a 
majority was denied by the employer, and the Board 
ordered an election. In the case of American Tobacco 
Company, 2 NLRB, decided September 1, 1936, an elec-
tion was ordered where the employer refused to recog-
nize the union claiming a majority of the employes 
engaged in the department held to be an· appropriate 
unit, on a finding that the union represented at least 
a substantial number. 
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In the case of In re International Nickel Company, 
Inc., 1 NLRB 907, decided June 11, 1936, it was held 
that a majority status dispute between union and em-
ployer regarding representation, together with employ-
er's refusal to bargain with the union, constitutes the 
basis for an election order. We quote a part of the 
Boards' conclusion as follows: 
''A question concerning the representation 
of the employees in the plant has arisen and has 
created discontent, unrest and bitterness and 
tends to lead to labor disputes, burdening and 
obstructing commerce, etc. '' 
In the case of Atlantic Refining Company, 1 NLRB 
359, decided March 19, 1936, the union presented 230 
cards recently signed by employes, in a unit of 316. The 
employer contended that many of the signatures were 
obtained by coercion and compulsion, and the Board 
ordered an election. 
In the case of Associated Press, 1 NLRB 686, de-
cided May 6, 1936, it was held that a dispute by the 
employer of the union's claim to represent a majority of 
the employes, and the employer's re.fusal to bargain 
collectively with such union, and the unrest among em-
ployes, resulting therefrom, raises a question of repre-
sentation, and is a sufficient basis for an election order 
by the Board. 
In the case of Burroughs Adding Machine Comparny, 
(1939) 14 NLRB 829, the employer introduced letters 
signed by a number of employes, renouncing their appli-
cations for membership in the union. The Board decided 
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that the doubt created by the evidence could be resolved 
best by an election to determine the bargaining repre-
sentative. Similarly is the case of Superior Felt Otnd 
Bedding Company, 14 NLRB 835. 
Further evidence of the present policy of N. L. R. B. 
to base its certifications on elections rather than on 
proof of a majority status, adduced at the hearing, is 
the case of Alpina Garment Company, (1939) 13 NLRB' 
720. 
In another case, decided in 1940, where the employer 
did not question the majority status of the union, the 
Board directed an election nevertheless, on the ground 
that the evidence consisting only of testimony concern-
ing the membership of the union was insufficient. 19 
NLRB 51. 
It is evident from the above decisions that from the 
inception of National Labor Relations Act, it has been 
the policy of N. L. R. B. to order an election, where 
there was any reasonable doubt as to the majority claims 
of the union, and that the Cudahy Packing , Company 
case (1939) cited above, marked the beginning of even 
a more liberal attitude on the part of the N. L. R. B. 
with reference to elections. From that time on, N. L. 
R. B. has steadfastly and consistently held to the posi-
tion that the determination of the Board in cases such 
as the one at bar, with respect to representation of the 
employes, looks to the initiation of collective bargaining 
between the company and its employes, and that the 
bargaining relations which result will be satisfactory 
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from the beginning, if the doubt and disagreement of 
the parties regarding the wishes of the employes is, as 
far as possible, eliminated, and that such -doubt and 
disagreement can best be eliminated by the holding of 
an election by secret ballot. Accordingly, since the 
Cudahy Packing Company case, it appears that N. L. 
R. B. has always ordered an election where doubt or 
disagreement of the parties regarding the wishes of the 
employes has been expressed. If such policy is good 
for N. L. R. B., as applied to the interpretation of 
the National Act, it most certainly should be the policy 
of the defendant Board with respect to the interpreta-
tion of the state law, which was copied from and is iden-
tical with the National Act. 
We further cite the case of N. L. R. B. vs. Fansteel 
Metallurgical Corporation, decided by the Supreme 
Court of the United States on February 27, 1939, and 
reported in 306 U. S. 240, 83 L. Ed. 627. In this case, 
there had been a lawful discharge of employes who had 
participated in a sit-down strike, and new men had been 
employed to replace them. Nevertheless, theN. L. R. B. 
had ordered the employer to bargain collectively with 
the union as the exclusive representative of the employes 
in the unit in question. We quote from the decision of 
th Court as follows : 
''Respondent resumed work about March 12, 
1937. The Board's order was made on March 14, 
1938. In view of the change in the situation by 
reason of the valid discharge of the si tdown 
strikers and the filling of positions with new men, 
we see no basis for a conclusion that after the 
resumption of work Lodge 66 was the choice 
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of a majority of respondent's employees for the 
purpose of colective bargaining. The Board's 
order properly requires respondent to desist from 
interfering in any manner with its employees in 
the exercise of their right to self -organization and 
to bargain collectively through representatives 
of their O"'"n choosing. But it is a differen.t mat-
ter to require respondent to treat Lodge 66 in the 
altered circumstances as such a representative. 
If it is contended that Lodge 66 is the choice 
of the employees, the Board has abunda;n.t a;uthor-
ity to settle the question by requiring an election.'' 
(Italics ours) 
We further respectfully call attention to the fact 
that the law in question defines no other method for 
determini~g such rna tters, and that the ' 'secret ballot' ' 
is the only method mentioned in the statute. Where' dis-
pute or disagreement exists, and where coercion, intim-
idation, and pressure upon the employes on the part of 
either the union or the employer may exist, it is appar-
ent that any method of determining the wishes of the 
employes which relies upon the expression given by 
the employes in the presence of any person, is inade-
quate and unsatisfactory in determining the employes' 
wishes. In such cases, a secret ballot is the employe's 
protection against such coercion, intimidation, and pres-
sure from any source whatsoever. It can harm no one; 
there can be no valid objection to it from any source; 
it is the American way, the democratic way, of guaran-
teeing to the citizen his sacred franchise; and it is the 
American way of guaranteeing to the employe his free 
expression of preference as to his representative. There 
can be no substitute for the secret ballot in such cases. 
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We respectfully contend, therefore, that, in the light 
of the employer's expressed opinion that the union has 
brought considerable pressure upon the employes, and 
that a free- expression of opinion can only be obtained 
by a secret ballot, and in further light of the consent 
of the union to the holding of a secret ballot, and in 
view, further, of the petition signed by thirty out of a 
total of forty-five e-mployes, as well as the memorandum 
of Chairman W. M. Knerr, filed with the record to the 
effect that ''subsequent to August 13, 1940, certain docu-
ments with reference to the- status of employes of the 
South East Furniture Company have been filed with 
the Commission,'; which documents the employer has 
requested the Commission to certify to the Court, but 
which the Commission has refused to do, there is ample 
doubt and disagreement as to the wishes of the employe·s 
in regard to representation, to justify an election, and 
that the action of the Board in denying a se-cret ballot, 
in view of all the circumstances, was an abuse of dis-
cretion; and that the cause should be remanded to the 
Board with directions to conduct a secret ballot. 
V. THE DECISION AND DETERMINA-
, TION OF THE BOARD WAS MADE SOLELY 
ON THE BASIS OF ALLEGED UNION AP-
PLICATIONS, AND WITHOU.T ANY EVI-
DENCE AS TO THE EMPLOYES' WISHES 
AT THE TIME OF THE BOARD'S DECISION. 
In the hearing of August 9, 1940, which was called 
for the purpose of determining the appropriate unit and 
the representative of the employes therein, the Board 
failed and refused entirely to s.eek any evidence to deter-
mine the- wishes of the employes at that time. 'rhrough-
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out the entire proceeding, and in its decision, the Board 
hearkened back to the date of July 26, 1940, and the 
decision of the Board was made solely upon the basis 
that the Board believed the union had a majority of the 
employes, as of July 26, 1940, and, therefore, the Board 
certified the union as the bargaining representative, as 
of the date of its decision, August 16, 1940, without 
attempting in any way to ascertain whether a change 
of representation occurred in the interim. 
It is our contention that if, at the said hearing, the 
Board was called upon to determine whether an unfair 
labor practice had been committed by the employer on 
July 26, ·1940, in refusing to bargain with the union as 
of that date, the Board should properly base its deci-
sion, in part at least, upon a determination of the union 
representation as of July 26, 1940, but in the case at bar 
the Board was called upon to determine the union repre-
sentation as of the present time, and, therefore, in the 
light of all the circumstances, it should have endeavored 
to determine the wishes of the employes as of the date 
of its decision. As was stated by the N. L. R. B. in the 
Cudahy Packing Company case-, cited above, which case 
is analagous in this respect, the Board was here con-
cerned with establishing representatives for future bar-
gaining purposes, and consequently, the Board should 
have decided, as N. L. R. B. did in the Cu~ahy case, that, 
under the circumstances, such future bargaining would 
best be effected by holding an election by secret ballot. 
VI. THE DECISION OF THE BOARD 
WAS MADE WHILE A STRIKE WAS IN 
PROGRESS AND WHILE INFORMAL 
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CHARGES OF ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR 
PRACTICES, FILED B Y T H E U N I 0 N 
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF WERE PEND-
ING AND UNDETERMINED, AND UPON 
WHICH THE PLAINTIFF HAD AS YET NO 
OPPORTUNITY OF BEING HEARD. 
At the time the Board conducted its hearing, and 
made its decision, a strike was in progress among some 
of the employes of the unit in question. The very exist-
ence of such a strike is proof positive of disagreement 
somewhere between the employes, the union, and the 
employer. It is an outstanding evidence of strife, and 
sometimes an indication of coercion or pressure some-
where along the line. Under these conditions, we submit 
that the Labor Board fails to exercise its discretion 
wisely or to promote the interests of harmony, good will, 
and understanding between all the parties, when it 
ruthlessly overrules the objections of the employer to 
the claims of the union as to representation, and denies 
the simple request made by the employer that a secret 
ballot be conducted, and, without further ado, orders the 
employer to bargain with the union on the basis merely 
of an alleged comparison with union applications of a 
list of the employes. 
It will be noted further that the file contains evi-
dence of informal.charges having been filed by the union 
against the employer, alleging unfair labor practices. 
For some reason, the defendant Board failed to call up 
for hearing the said charges, and the said charges have 
been pending since that time, without hearing. The very 
existence of such informal charges is further evidence 
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of strife a.nd contention between the union, the em-
ployes, and the employer, and constitutes a further rea-
son and justification for the employer's request that 
an election be held. Under these circumstances, it is 
submitted that the Boards' refusal to heed the employ-
ers' request for an election was unjustified. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY & NELSON, 
Attorney for Plaintiff. 
37 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
